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[1] In June 1999, Sandy Murphy and Rick Tabish were arrested and 
charged with murder, robbery, burglary, and grand larceny related to the 
death of Las Vegas casino mogul Lonnie “Ted” Binion.1  The subsequent 
trial provided a captivated public with the elements of murder, greed, 
betrayal, torture, and extortion.2 
 
[2] Magellan Research (a public opinion research firm owned by the 
author of this article) was contacted by members of the defense team to 
conduct public opinion polls on their behalf.  Magellan conducted three 
polls during the trial.3  The first poll was conducted just days before jury 
selection.  It questioned a random sample of the general public and 
collected their answers to key questions from completed jury 
                                                     
* J.D. Boyd School of Law, magna cum laude, University of Nevada Las Vegas 2001.  
B.B.A., Management Information Systems, Texas Tech University, 1982.  The author is a 
practicing attorney and President/CEO of Magellan Research, a Las Vegas-based public 
opinion research firm.  
1 Jeff German, Murphy, Tabish Jailed in Binion Murder Case, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 25, 
2000, http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/archives/1999/jun/25/508975973.html 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2006).  
2 Id. 
3 This article is only concerned with the first poll conducted by Magellan.  The second 
poll questioned people watching the trial on television regarding the believability of 
witnesses and the effectiveness of counsel and the judge.  The third poll, conducted 
immediately prior to closing arguments, questioned these same viewers on the verdicts 
they would issue if they were on the jury.  Members of this “electronic jury” indicated 
that they, too, would have returned “guilty” verdicts on nearly all counts.  
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questionnaires.  The defense then compared the poll results to the 
responses of the prospective jurors.4 
 
[3] The defense applied the poll results to the jury questionnaires to 
determine which jurors would be most advantageous to the defense.  The 
defense devised a rating scale (based on key questionnaire answers and 
demographic data) and ranked 296 members of the jury venire.  Although 
these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful (both defendants were 
convicted),5 the defense selected a jury 97% certain (if the jurors were 
indeed representative of the public at large) that the defendants were guilty 
that nevertheless needed eight days of deliberation to return guilty 
verdicts. 
 
[4] Though the polling was valuable to the defense, a lingering question 
remained: is the use of polling and questionnaires in jury selection fair and 
proper?  The propriety of using polling and questionnaires to select a jury 
should be evaluated with a careful eye toward the potential for conflict 
with the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Batson v. Kentucky6 and J.E.B. 
v. Alabama ex rel T.B.7  These cases dealt with race and gender based 
discrimination, respectively, in jury selection.  The Court held in these 
cases that use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors for discriminatory 
reasons was unconstitutional.8  It became apparent during the Binion trial 
that the techniques employed by the defense might be used to circumvent 
Batson and its progeny.  An overzealous attorney could conceivably use 
                                                     
4 The first issue considered involved change of venue.  The data indicated that, if the 
defense wanted a change of venue, it would likely succeed using the poll results as a 
barometer of public sentiment.  Over 97% of the 624 people polled believed that Murphy 
and Tabish were guilty of murder. 
5 While both Murphy and Tabish were convicted of several charges including first-degree 
murder, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed all those convictions and remanded for a 
new trial because the trial court failed to sever additional charges brought against Tabish 
alone. Tabish v. State, 119 Nev. 293, 296, 314 (Nev. 2003).  On retrial, a jury found 
Murphy and Tabish not guilty of murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder and 
robbery, but guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary and grand larceny (Lisa 
Sweetingham, Former Lovers Cleared of Casino Mogul’s Murder, COURTTV.COM, Nov. 
23, 2004, http://www.courttv.com/trials/binion/112304_verdict_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 
9, 2006)).  
6 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
7 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
8 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143; Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.  
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information attained by an opinion poll or jury questionnaire to disguise a 
conscious effort to eliminate potential jurors because of their race or 
gender.   
 
[5] For example, a venireman might be asked if he had ever owned a 
handgun.  At first glance, such a question might not seem discriminatory at 
all.  But what if, in a particular community, 92% of all black males owned 
handguns while only 14% of the rest of the population owned handguns?  
An attorney armed with this knowledge (which could be collected by 
either public opinion polls or jury questionnaires) could conceivably strike 
veniremen based on the response to this question, essentially excluding 
black males from the jury in violation of both Batson and J.E.B.  The 
discriminatory intent and effect would remain even if the attorney was 
forced to exclude a few handgun owners who were not black males (to 
preserve the illusion).  Therefore, it is possible that knowing too much 
about the venire and the surrounding community could actually increase 
the likelihood of discrimination in jury selection. 
 
[6] The Texas Court of Appeals recently encountered this issue in Shelling 
v. State.9  There, the Defendant was convicted of murdering a friend of his 
estranged wife by shooting him five times, stabbing him 11 times, and 
cutting his throat.10  The Defendant appealed his conviction on several 
grounds, including a Batson claim.11  During the trial the State asked 
veniremen if they believed the O. J. Simpson murder trial verdict was 
correct.12  The State then used its peremptory challenges to strike members 
of the panel that believed that the verdict was proper.13 
 
[7] The State did not dispute that the Defendant established a prima facie 
case that there was a discriminatory effect against African-Americans 
under Batson.14  The State, however, rebutted the presumption that there 
was purposeful discrimination by providing race-neutral reasons why each 
of the strikes were made, and by noting that a white member of the venire 
                                                     
9 Shelling v. State, 52 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. App. 2001). 
10 Id. at 217. 
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was struck who also believed that the Simpson verdict was correct.15  The 
Court of Appeals, by a 6-3 vote, affirmed the judgment of the trial court in 
that the State satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the strikes were not 
racially motivated.16 
 
[8] The Shelling decision highlights the problem now confronting courts 
throughout the nation.  Is it enough for a party to present a race-neutral 
explanation to justify a peremptory strike?  Are there questions that may 
be posed to veniremen that serve as a pretext for discrimination against a 
class of citizens?  Can the court apply a test to determine whether such a 
question has a discriminatory effect, whether intentional or accidental?  
Part I of this article examines the series of cases that have established the 
constitutional limits on the use of peremptory challenges.  Additionally, 
tools such as public opinion polls and jury questionnaires are examined 
insofar as they might be employed in jury selection.  Part II discusses the 
problem of using questions that are merely a pretext for discrimination in 
voir dire.  Part II further offers a test for scientifically evaluating whether a 
proposed question for the venire is appropriate and fair, or whether it is, 
instead, merely a pretext designed to justify the use of peremptory 
challenges based on race or gender.  This proposed solution involves the 
use of public opinion polls and/or juror questionnaires to help determine 
whether particular responses are so closely associated with race, ethnic 
origin, or gender that to use them as a basis for peremptory challenge 




A. DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION 
 
[9] The racial turmoil of the early 1960’s and the ratification of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196417 were factors impacting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
most recent reviews of discrimination based on race in jury selection.  
Until the 1960’s, the law in this area had been relatively well established.  
For almost a hundred years prior to the Civil Rights Act, the seminal case 
                                                     
15 Shelling, 52 S.W.2d at 219-20. 
16 Id. at 220. 
17 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2005). 
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in this area was Strauder v. West Virginia.18  In 1874 a black man was 
tried and convicted of murder.  Under West Virginia law at the time, white 
males over the age of 21 were the only citizens eligible for jury service.19  
In its opinion, the Court stated that ending the oppression of the Black race 
was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.20  Therefore, the Court 
held that the West Virginia statute excluding Blacks from serving on juries 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.21  The Court further noted that this 
conclusion did not guarantee that any defendant had a right to a jury 
comprised (in whole or in part) of persons of similar color, but instead 
held merely that state law could not, consistent with the Constitution, 
exclude all persons of a particular race or color from jury service.22  It is 
important to note that the Court’s decision was based on its concern for the 
equal protection rights of the defendant, rather than for the rights of 
prospective jurors excluded from jury service.23 
 
[10] For ninety years Strauder remained the guiding force behind the 
selection of grand juries and venire panels.  In Swain v. Alabama, 
however, the Court first considered the racially motivated use of 
peremptory challenges in selecting the juries themselves, rather than in 
assembly of the venire panel.24  In Swain, the defendant was a black man 
accused of raping a white woman.25  During voir dire, the prosecutor used 
peremptory challenges to exclude six of the eight black men in the 
venire.26  Despite this overt act of discrimination, the Court held that the 
defendant had failed to meet the burden of proving that black jurors had 
been deliberately excluded.27  The Court held that peremptory challenges 
                                                     
18 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
19 Id. at 305. 
20 Id. at 306 (stating “[T]his is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a 
common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through 
many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race 
enjoy.”). 
21 Id. at 309. 
22 Id. at 305. 
23 Id. 
24 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
25 Id. at 231. 
26 Id. at 205. 
27 Id. at 226 (finding that Alabama, while using jury selection procedures that 
significantly reduced the representation of black males, had not totally excluded them 
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were, by their very nature, discretionary.28  Subjecting litigants to Equal 
Protection Clause scrutiny would weaken the value of discretionary 
challenges and subject them to “scrutiny for reasonableness and 
sincerity.”29   
 
[11] Additionally, the Swain Court held that discrimination could only be 
proven by showing that the prosecutor had consistently excluded black 
jurors in other cases, regardless of the circumstances, crime, or racial 
background of the parties.30  Thus, under Swain, a defendant could not rely 
merely on the peremptory challenges exercised in his own case to show 
discrimination; instead, he had to show a pattern of discrimination over a 
series of cases.  This seemingly oppressive burden for proving 
discrimination in jury selection remained the standard for over twenty 
years, despite the fact that records concerning peremptory strikes were not 
even kept by most courts.31 
 
[12] The Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky32 relaxed the Swai court’s 
“crippling burden of proof.”33  The defendant in Batson, a black man, was 
convicted by an all-white jury of burglary and receipt of stolen goods.34  
After voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to 
exclude all of the blacks in the venire.35  In considering the defense’s 
objection to these strikes, the trial court held that the parties were entitled 
to use their peremptory strikes in any manner they chose.36  As in Strauder 
and Swain, the Court analyzed the equal protection issue in terms of the 
rights of the defendant rather than of prospective jurors.37  Unlike Swain, 
however, the Batson Court held that a defendant need only show that he is 
a “member of a cognizable group” to show discrimination, rather than 
                                                                                                                                    
from jury service.  Had Alabama done so, their jury selection scheme would have 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).   
28 Id. at 221. 
29 Id. at 222. 
30 Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. 
31 Joel H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection, 
16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295, 326 (1996). 
32 Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
33 Id. at 92. 
34 Id. at 82-83. 
35 Id. at 83. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 2 
 
7 
show the pattern of discrimination required under Swain.38  Hence, a 
defendant could make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial 
discrimination solely by using the facts of his own case, rather than having 
to show a pattern of discriminatory acts.39 
 
[13] Equally important is Batson’s articulation of a three-step, burden 
shifting mechanism for evaluating claims of discrimination against black 
jurors.  First, the Court established that trial judges can use all relevant 
circumstances to decide if a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges 
forms a prima facie case of discrimination.40  Once that showing has been 
made, the burden shifts back to the State to provide a neutral explanation 
for the challenges.41  The court must then evaluate the explanation to 
determine if there has been purposeful discrimination.42  Note that this 
burden shifting approach does not preclude the use of peremptory 
challenges that seem racially motivated, so long as the challenging party 
can show a race neutral reasoning for the challenge that satisfies the court. 
Since 1986, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that have 
broadened the scope of Batson v. Kentucky.  In Powers v. Ohio, the Court 
held that a defendant could object to racially motivated peremptory 
challenges even when the defendant and the challenged juror were of 
different races.43  Additionally, Powers is significant in that the Court, for 
the first time, considered the equal protection rights of the excluded juror 
(i.e., every citizen’s right to be eligible for jury service) rather than the 
rights of the defendant.44 
 
[14] In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court considered whether 
Batson should apply to civil actions as well as criminal cases.45  In this 
case, a black construction worker brought a negligence action for injuries 
in a job-site accident.  Counsel for Leesville Concrete exercised two of 
their three peremptory strikes to exclude blacks from the jury.46  The 
                                                     
38 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 97. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 98. 
43 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). 
44 Id. at 414. 
45 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1991). 
46 Id. at 617. 
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Supreme Court expanded the holding in Batson to include civil cases, 
noting that racial discrimination in a civil case “harms the excluded juror 
no less than discrimination in a criminal trial.”47   
 
[15] The Supreme Court next looked to peremptory challenges that, while 
facially neutral, had a disparate impact upon certain racial groups.  In 
Hernandez v. New York, a juror was challenged on the basis of his ability 
to speak Spanish in a case where some of the witnesses were expected to 
testify in Spanish, given the juror’s conceded reluctance to accept only the 
interpreter’s version of the testimony.48  In a plurality opinion, Justice 
Kennedy noted that, unless discriminatory intent is inherent in the 
challenger’s actions, the reasoning offered will be deemed race neutral.49  
Justice O’Connor concurred and went even farther, stating that the reason 
for the challenge must not be the juror’s race itself, but for matters related 
to the juror’s race (e.g., fluency in Spanish as in Hernandez).50 
 
[16] The Batson decision regarding race was revisited by the Court in 
Georgia v. McCollum.51  Here, the Court further expanded Batson to 
prohibit the use of racially motivated challenges by criminal defendants 
(thus placing defense counsel under the same restrictions as prosecutors).52 
Even after McCollum, the issue of gender-based discrimination remained.  
Attempts to apply Batson analysis to gender discrimination were initially 
unsuccessful.  For example, in United States v. Hamilton, a defense 
attorney cited Batson in his claim that the prosecution’s challenges of three 
potential jurors were racially motivated (since all three were African-
American).53  The prosecutor countered that race was not the reason – 
instead, he struck the jurors because they were women.54  The trial court 
held that there were no constitutional difficulties so long as the reasons for 
striking the jurors were racially neutral.55  On appeal the Fourth Circuit 
                                                     
47 Id. at 619. 
48 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
49 Id. at 360. 
50 Id. at 375. 
51 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 47 (1992). 
52 Id. at 59. 
53 United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1040 (4th Cir. 1988). 
54 Id. at 1041. 
55 Id. at 1040. 
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agreed, finding that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibited gender-based peremptory challenges.56 
 
[17] Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to 
address the issue of gender-based peremptory challenges in J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel T.B..57  In J.E.B., a father challenged the state’s use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude men from juries in paternity actions.58  
Though the Court had traditionally evaluated gender-based discrimination 
with a lesser degree of scrutiny than race-based discrimination,59 it held in 
J.E.B. that gender-based peremptory challenges were constitutionally 
prohibited as well.60   
 
[18] The Court based its decisions in Batson and its progeny on the rights 
of both litigants and prospective jurors under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Defendants, however, have an additional Sixth Amendment right to select 
a jury from a pool of citizens that represents a fair cross-section of the 
community.61  In determining what constitutes a fair cross-section, courts 
                                                     
56 Id. at 1043. 
57 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1994).  
58 Id. at 129. 
59 Jere W. Morehead, When A Peremptory Challenge is no Longer Peremptory: Batson’s 
Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender-
based classifications receive a lesser degree of scrutiny than do those based on race)).  
See also Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding 
an important governmental objective is sufficient reason for gender discrimination). 
60 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141-42.  See also Swift, supra note 31 at 338.  The J.E.B. Court did 
not go so far as to equate gender-based challenges with race-based challenges; instead, 
the difference in philosophy between these types of challenges is best described as 
follows:  
The J.E.B. Court thus simply declared, without any doctrinal support, a 
principle of jury selection/equal protection doctrine: challenges based 
on assumptions of group thinking among groups typically or 
traditionally subject to stereotyping are unconstitutional 
notwithstanding the body of doctrine holding that the justification for 
gender discrimination need not rise to the level of importance as that 
offered for racial discrimination; challenges based on arbitrary and 
capricious judgments about group thinking with regard to all other 
classifications are valid notwithstanding the body of doctrine holding 
that governmental classifications may never be arbitrary. Id. 
61 United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1084 (1996); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2001) (“[Parties] have the right to grand and 
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have typically limited the right to “cognizable groups” (i.e., groups that are 
already protected to a greater degree under the Equal Protection Clause).62  
To summarize, the Sixth Amendment provides that the venire must be a 
fair cross-section of the community, while the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees both defendants and jurors that discriminatory practices will 
not be permitted when selecting jurors from the venire.  This distinction 
will be particularly important when the Court’s decision in Purkett v. 
Elem63 is explored later in this article. 
 
[19] In the future, it is likely that the Court will be presented with further 
opportunities to broaden the Batson decision by deciding that “cognizable 
group” status be extended to religious affiliation,64 age,65 level of 
education,66 physical handicap,67 and other distinguishing characteristics 
                                                                                                                                    
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or 
division wherein the court convenes”);  see also Andrew W. Leopold, Constitutionalizing 
Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 949 (1998) 
(citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990)) [hereinafter Leopold]; Id. at n. 16 
(quoting Grisham, 63 F.3d at 1079-80 (“The ‘community’ from which the potential jurors 
are drawn can be as broad as the judicial district in which the crime occurred.”)). 
62 Leopold, supra note 61, at 967-69. 
63 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). 
64 See United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (determining that Jews 
were a cognizable group for the purpose of Sixth Amendment protection of their right to 
representation in the venire).  But see also Grech v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 747, 750 n.3 
(5th Cir. 1974) (requiring proof that the Jewish population was substantial enough in the 
community before acknowledging that Jews were a cognizable group.  The proof was not 
critical, however, as the judge had merely provided Jewish veniremen with the option to 
exclude themselves from jury duty to observe Yom Kippur; the judge had not 
purposefully excluded all Jews from the venire). 
65 Efforts to have particular sectors of the population defined as cognizable groups based 
on age have thus far been unsuccessful.  See Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 
(11th Cir. 1988) (stating that in a murder trial, the defendant alleged that persons age 18 
to 29 were a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment cross-section claim purposes); State 
v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (stating that in a murder trial, the 
defendant alleged that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the granting of 
exemptions from jury service for members of the venire that were over 65 and desired 
such exemption).  One group of people over the age of 65 did succeed in State v. 
Williams, 342 So.2d 1325, 1326 (Ala. App. 1976) (holding persons over 65 were 
systematically excluded from the venire without providing them with the opportunity to 
serve). 
66 See United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that in a 
marijuana importation case, neither persons 18-34 nor persons whose education was 
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for the purpose of asserting the defendant’s (and prospective juror’s) Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
 
B. USE OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN JURY SELECTION 
 
[20] As public opinion survey technology has improved, and polls have 
become more generally accepted, the courts have become more receptive 
to their use in trials.  Although as late as the 1950’s, courts were generally 
dubious about the usefulness of surveys; in recent years, courts have been 
more receptive to the use of polling results in the courtroom.   
 
[21] Historically, public opinion survey evidence was subject to exclusion 
because it is, by its very nature, hearsay.  In 1953, for example, the Florida 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of a poll that showed that 
a black defendant accused of raping a white woman could not get a fair 
trial in the county where the crime allegedly occurred.68  This decision 
greatly diminished the potential for use of polling data in trials, as 
proponents were forced in some cases to parade dozens of interviewers 
and respondents to the witness stand in order to overcome the inevitable 
hearsay objections.69 
 
[22] Introduction of survey evidence through the testimony of the 
participants was indeed cumbersome.  Recognizing this, one court took a 
significant step toward allowing admission of polling evidence in Zippo 
Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc.70  There, the manufacturer of a 
popular cigarette lighter sued an importer for trademark infringement and 
                                                                                                                                    
limited to high school or below qualified as a cognizable group for jury selection 
purposes). 
67 See State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Mo. 1985) (holding, in a trial in which a 
deaf defendant was accused of murder, that since deafness can occur to persons in all 
walks of life, the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not impaired by a jury pool that had 
no deaf members). 
68 Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1953) (en banc).  The defendant in this case 
attempted to introduce the survey results into evidence through the testimony of the 
polling company executive who supervised the survey.  Because the executive had not 
actually conducted the polling himself, the court excluded his testimony as “hearsay upon 
hearsay.” Id.  
69 Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 75 (10th Cir. 1958).  See also 
Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943). 
70 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
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unfair competition.71  In order to prove their claim, Zippo attempted to 
introduce the results of surveys that showed respondents were so confused 
by the appearance of Rogers’ lighters that they mistakenly identified them 
as “Zippo” lighters.72  The court, while admitting that survey evidence was 
hearsay, allowed it nevertheless and stated: 
 
Regardless of whether the surveys in this case could be 
admitted under the non-hearsay approach, they are 
admissible because the answers of respondents are 
expressions of presently existing state of mind, attitude, or 
belief.  There is a recognized exception to the hearsay rule 
for such statements, and under it the statements are 
admissible to prove the truth of the matter contained 
therein.73 
 
[23] Thus, the procedural obstacles regarding admissibility of survey 
evidence have been significantly reduced.  Recently, recognition of the 
validity of survey evidence was demonstrated in Schering Corp. v. Pfizer 
Inc.74  There the court discussed the history of excluding survey evidence75 
in a case alleging false advertising in violation of a prior settlement 
agreement between the parties,76 and held that the weight granted to 
survey evidence should be based on whether: 
 
1) the “universe” was properly defined, (2) a representative 
sample of that universe was selected, (3) the questions to be 
asked of interviewees were framed in a clear, precise and 
non-leading manner, (4) sound interview procedures were 
followed by competent interviewers who had no knowledge 
of the litigation or the purpose for which the survey was 
conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately reported, 
(6) the data was analyzed in accordance with accepted 
                                                     
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 680-81. 
73 Id. at 683. 
74 Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999). 
75 Id. at 224.  See generally DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods., 6 F. Supp. 859, 
884-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1934); Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 376-77 
(D. Del. 1928). 
76 Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 221. 
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statistical principles and (7) the objectivity of the entire 
process was ensured.77 
 
[24] Today, survey evidence is generally accepted under certain 
conditions.  For example, in Liberty Financial Management Corp. v. 
Beneficial Data Processing Corp., an employee survey was entered into 
evidence in a breach of contract lawsuit.78  The lawsuit concerned the 
implementation of a computer system that ultimately proved faulty.79  The 
plaintiff, Liberty, entered into evidence the results of a survey of its 
employees.80  The survey was conducted to determine how much time 
employees spent on computer problems both before and after the 
implementation of the faulty system.81  In ruling on the survey’s 
admissibility, the court stated: 
 
[W]e recognize that statistically reliable surveys are an 
accepted tool used regularly in formulating highly 
sophisticated business decisions.  They are an accepted 
method of determining truth as perceived through the 
collective judgment of enormous segments of the 
population.  Given the verity that surveys are accorded in 
everyday life, we see no reason to exclude them from the 
consideration of the trier of fact in a complex case such as 
the one at hand.82 
 
[25] Survey evidence has been admitted as relevant to a variety of issues 
such as ruling on the constitutionality of federal statutes83 and 
contradicting poor election results to show a favorable reputation among 
                                                     
77 Id. at 225. 
78 Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1984).  
79 Id. at 46. 
80 Id. at 53. 
81 Id. 
82 Id at 55. 
83 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1987). A United States citizen appealed a 
decision that classified films he was showing as “political propaganda.”  The appellee 
(Keene) introduced the results of a Gallup poll that showed that the public would be less 
inclined to vote for him if the films were classified as such. 
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colleagues.84 It is important to note, however, that the use of polling data 
as evidence is still subject to the same scrutiny as other forms of expert 
testimony and standards of documentation.85 
 
C. USE OF JURY QUESTIONNAIRES IN JURY SELECTION 
 
[26] Questionnaires have been used in the courtroom for at least forty 
years.  Written questionnaires are often provided to prospective jurors to 
quicken the subsequent voir dire and to provide a forum for asking delicate 
questions that members of the venire are unlikely to be comfortable 
answering in a courtroom setting in the presence of others.86  Silliphant v. 
Sheriff of New York, decided in 1959, is one of the earliest instances in 
which a court ruled on the use of questionnaires.87  The questionnaire in 
that case was not being used for jury selection; instead, it was being used 
by a grand jury as a supplement for grand jury testimony.88  The court 
concluded that witnesses could be compelled to answer questionnaires 
being utilized as a supplement for grand jury testimony.89 
 
[27] The court in People v. Carter considered whether the use of 
questionnaires was discriminatory in an appeal of a conviction for the 
murder of a California highway patrolman.90  The jury commissioner in 
this case routinely sent 2,500 jury questionnaires each year to randomly 
selected persons chosen from registered voter lists and local telephone 
directories.91  The questionnaires did not inquire as to the racial 
classification of the respondents, and the jury commissioner did not 
conduct interviews with the respondents and therefore did not have visual 
                                                     
84 Ollman v. Evans, 713 F.2d 838, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1983), aff’d on rehearing, 750 F.2d 
970 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
85 Robert G. Sugarman & Nancy S. Scherer, The Use of Experts and Survey Evidence in 
Copyright, Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, 395 PLI/PAT 413, 428 (Oct. 
1994).  Generally, survey evidence must provide in discovery detailed records of the 
vendor’s methods and practices and is subject to cross-examination on these practices 
once the evidence has been introduced. 
86 See Matthew L. Larrabee & Linda P. Drucker, Adieu Voir Dire: The Jury 
Questionnaire, 21 NO. 1 LITIG. 37 (1994). 
87 Silliphant v. Sheriff of New York, 160 N.E.2d 890, 891 (N.Y. 1959). 
88 Id. at 890. 
89 Id. at 892. 
90 People v. Carter, 364 P.2d 477, 479 (Cal. 1961).  
91 Id. at 489.  
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notice of race.92  The defendant claimed that the use of questionnaires for 
jury selection excluded “persons with the same racial, economic, social, 
and geographic background as the defendant.”93  However, the defendant 
lacked facts to support his contention that the questionnaires were mailed 
unfairly, while the jury commissioner’s affidavit described the methods 
employed to distribute the questionnaires.94  The court held there was 
neither evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the state, nor 
evidence that the empanelled jury was not a representative cross-section of 
the community.95 
 
[28] A similar complaint of discrimination regarding the use of 
questionnaires met with an equally disdainful response in United States v. 
Hoffa.96  There, the defendant, Jimmy Hoffa, claimed that the jury panel 
assembled with the aid of jury questionnaires was not ethnically 
representative of the community.97  His claim was dismissed with little 
discussion, since there were no ethnic questions included in the 
questionnaire and the defendant’s complaint was based merely on the 
visual inspection of the jury panel immediately prior to voir dire.98 
 
[29] In recent years, the use of jury questionnaires has become 
commonplace.99  In fact, Cathy E. Bennett, a leading jury and trial 
consultant, has written that her “experience has shown that the advantages 
of a questionnaire dramatically outweigh any and all disadvantages.”100  
These disadvantages affect both sides of the aisle in criminal proceedings.  
Some defense lawyers resist the use of jury questionnaires for fear that the 
                                                     
92 Id. 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 United States v. Hoffa, 235 F. Supp. 611, 615 (E.D. Tenn. 1964). 
97 Id. at 613. 
98 Id. 
99 The use of jury questionnaires has been the subject of numerous articles and notes in 
law reviews and magazines.  See Jury Questionnaire Assists Defense in Intentional Tort 
Trial, 8 NO. 8 INSIDE LITIG. 7, 9 (1994); see also Cathy E. Bennett, Robert B. Hirschborn 
& Heather R. Epstein, How to Conduct a Meaningful Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 46 
SMU L. REV. 659, 662 (1992) [hereinafter Bennett]; Robert B. Sykes & Francis J. 
Carney, Attorney Voir Dire And Jury Questionnaire: Time For a Change, 10 UTAH B.J. 
13 (1997). 
100 Bennett, supra note 99, at 662. 
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answers contained therein will identify and expose a juror with atypical 
attitudes that might create a hung jury if seated.101  Alternatively, 
prosecutors worry that the use of a questionnaire might similarly expose 
jurors who are pro-law enforcement.102   
 
[30] It is important to note that these same concerns exist where no 
questionnaire is used at all, because oral voir dire can just as easily expose 
the juror predispositions outlined above.  The court, however, usually 
places stringent restrictions on voir dire.103  Often, attorneys cannot even 
question the panel; judges control the voir dire process and do all of the 
questioning.104  Even if attorneys are allowed to actively participate, there 
are usually strict limitations on time and question content.105  The use of 
questionnaires makes it more likely that relevant attitudes will be 
discovered, since many more questions can be asked in a questionnaire 
than can be asked in the compressed timeframe offered by oral voir dire.106  
Moreover, the use of a questionnaire eliminates the possibility that the 
jurors that remain will harbor ill will toward an attorney, or the judge, for 
asking probative and delicate questions because in a questionnaire jurors 
are unaware which of the parties proposed the question.107 
 
[31] An important consideration involves where to draw the line on venire 
questioning.  How much information is too much?  Some attorneys, and 
some judges as well, subscribe to the “any 12 in the box” theory, which 
provides that nearly any venireman is an appropriate juror, so long as she 
believes that she can consider the case fairly.108  At the opposite end of the 
spectrum are those attorneys who feel that jurors are substantially affected 
                                                     
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See Beverly Petersen Jennison, Trial Court Discretion in Conducting the Voir Dire 
Subjected to More Stringent Scrutiny: Cordero v. United States, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1121, 1134 (1984). 
104 See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People With Green Socks? 
Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1179, 1183-84 (2003). 
105 Jennison, supra note 103, at 1123. 
106 Larabee, supra note 86, at 662.  
107 See Lin S. Lilley, Let Jurors Speak the Truth, in Writing, 41 TRIAL 64, 65-66 (2005). 
108 See Abbe Smith, Nice Work if You Can Get It: “Ethical” Jury Selection in Criminal 
Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 525 (1998). 
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in deliberations by their life experiences and social attitudes.109  It is safe 
to presume, with the ever increasing use of questionnaires and opinion 
surveys, that today’s litigator will inevitably be placed in a position where 





[32] There is a substantial danger, given the Court’s holdings in Batson 
and its progeny, that parties will develop voir dire or jury questionnaire 
questions that merely serve as a subterfuge for their true intent – 
discrimination on the basis of race or gender.  The analysis which follows 
examines recent decisions providing counsel great latitude during voir 
dire.  In order to honor the fundamental premise of the Batson decision, it 
is important to develop a procedure employing public opinion polling and 
jury questionnaires to help the trial court discern when a question has the 
potential for being used with discriminatory intent.  This article proposes a 
procedure, the “Z-Test,” which will provide the trial court with a method 
to differentiate between questions asked with discriminatory intent and 
questions that may have a legitimate role in voir dire. 
 
A. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS VS. JURY QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
[33] In order to determine whether any proposed question is potentially 
discriminatory, the court must consider whether responses to the question 
are closely associated with certain racial, ethnic, or gender groups.110  To 
perform this assessment, the court must first decide whether the use of a 
public opinion poll or a jury questionnaire is most appropriate.111  The key 
factor in making this determination involves the size of the sample (in this 
                                                     
109 See Larabee, supra note 86, at 37-38.  
110 See J. Vincent Aprile II, More Extensive Voir Dire: A Supreme Court Mandate?, 9 
CRIM. JUST. 43, 45 (1994). 
111 For clarity, it is important to define the meaning of “public opinion polls” and “jury 
questionnaires.”  For purposes of this note, public opinion polls will be considered to be 
the interviewing of citizens outside the venire.  Jury questionnaires, on the other hand, 
will refer to those instruments distributed to the venire, and collected back from the 
veniremen, prior to voir dire to streamline the jury selection process. See Joseph F. Flynn, 
Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Trials: Bringing Sheppard v. Maxwell into the Nineties, 
27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 857, 875 (1993).  
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case, the venire).  Public opinion polls typically strive to collect at least 
400 responses in order to achieve a confidence level of 95 percent that the 
results will be within “plus or minus” 5 percent of the true opinion on any 
issue.  Thus, any meaningful results from a jury questionnaire used to 
gauge public opinion would require at least 400 responses. 
 
[34] Does this mean that the venire must be at least 400 members?  
Absolutely not.  Instead, this only requires that at least 400 completed 
questionnaires be returned to the jury administrator.  Thus, a jury 
administrator could send the questionnaires to all potential jurors for a 
variety of cases, compiling the results for use in the case proposing the 
potentially discriminatory question.  Sophisticated jury panel managers 
could even archive the poll results for future use when similar questions 
are evaluated for their potential discriminatory effect. 
 
[35] Public opinion polling remains an option, albeit an expensive one, to 
determine the likelihood of discriminatory effect of a voir dire question.  If 
the polling option is employed, perhaps at the expense of the party 
wanting to use the suspect question, polling firms can typically return 
results in a matter of days. 
 
[36] Regardless of the method chosen, results of the poll or questionnaires 
must be compiled and cross-tabulated to report the answers to questions by 
racial and gender responses.  These results would then be used as the basis 
for application of the Z-Test. 
 
B. WHEN DO APPARENTLY VALID QUESTIONS BECOME A  
PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION? 
 
[37] Invariably, a party will ask a question during voir dire that is neutral 
on its face, but in reality, offers an opportunity to be used for a 
discriminatory purpose or has an unintended discriminatory effect.  If that 
party uses the answer to that question as a basis for exercise of a 
peremptory strike, opposing counsel may exercise a Batson challenge to 
protest the use of a presumably discriminatory challenge. 
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[38] Batson analysis requires that the challenging party provide the court 
with a “neutral explanation” for the use of the peremptory challenge.112  
The Supreme Court clarified the definition of “neutral explanation” with 
its holding in Purkett v. Elem.113  The defendant in this case, a black male, 
was convicted of robbery in Missouri.114  Defendant’s counsel objected, 
citing Batson, to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges excluding 
two black males from the jury.115  The prosecutor contended that his 
reason for striking the black male jurors was because they had facial 
hair.116  The defendant appealed with no success, until his case reached the 
Eighth Circuit.  There, the court held that the prosecutor’s explanation was 
pretextual and that the trial court had committed clear error by not finding 
that the challenges were discriminatory.117  The Supreme Court reversed 
the Eighth Circuit, finding that a legitimate reason for a challenge under 
Batson was “not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny 
equal protection.”118 
 
[39] At least one court decided that Batson’s original approach to the 
determination of pretextual discrimination is preferable to the Court’s 
application of Batson in Purkett.  In People v. Jamison, a California 
appellate court openly disagreed with Purkett, calling it a “digression from 
prior federal law” that would reduce motions alleging discrimination via 
peremptory challenge to “nothing more than an empty gesture.”119  At this 
point, it is unclear whether litigants relying on Batson’s three-step burden-
shifting analysis regarding peremptory challenges are limited by Purkett’s 
holding that even the most ridiculous reasons for challenge are appropriate 
so long as they are facially neutral. 
 
[40] Based on the Court’s holding in Purkett, trial courts are now forced to 
deal with what one court in Illinois has called a “charade:” 
 
                                                     
112Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986). 
113Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). 
114See id. at 766. 
115Id. 
116Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Purkett, 514 U.S. at App. 41 (No. 94-802)). 
117Id. at 767 (citing Elem. v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 684 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
118Id. at 769. 
119People v. Jamison, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 686 (1996). 
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[W]e now consider the charade that has become the Batson 
process.  The State may provide the trial court with a series 
of pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory 
challenges.  Since reviewing courts examine only the 
record, we wonder if the reasons can be given without a 
smile.  Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual, 
probably entitled, “Handy Race-Neutral Explanations” or 
“20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.”  It might 
include: too old, too young, divorced, “long, unkempt hair,” 
free-lance writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack of 
family contact, attempting to make eye contact with the 
defendant, “lived in an area consisting predominantly of 
apartment complexes,” single, over-educated, lack of 
maturity, improper demeanor, unemployed, improper attire, 
juror lived alone, misspelled place of employment, living 
with girlfriend, unemployed spouse, spouse employed as 
school teacher, employment as part-time barber, friendship 
with city council member, failure to remove hat, lack of 
community ties, children same “age bracket” as defendant, 
deceased father and prospective juror’s aunt receiving 
psychiatric care.120 
 
[41] Despite the judge’s humorous interpretation of the Purkett ruling, 
each of the above reasons would actually survive a Batson challenge under 
Purkett.  It is likely that such broad latitude was granted by the Court, in 
part because there was no test apparent to them that would more readily 
identify pretextual jury challenges.  This article presents a workable test to 
address this problem, inspired by the burden-shifting framework 





                                                     
120People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (citing examples from 
various Illinois cases).  This stinging commentary was delivered in reversing a conviction 
following the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike a black prospective 
juror, justified on the ground that the venireman was a high school principal and that 
people that work with students are “much more forgiving.” Id. at 68. 
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C. A PROPOSED TEST FOR DIFFERENTIATING DISCRIMINATION IN VOIR DIRE 
FROM ZEALOUS ADVOCACY 
 
[42] The first challenge in implementing the test is determining the extent 
to which it will be applied.  It is easy to see that such a test would be 
useful in cases of purposeful discrimination.  But what about situations 
where the discrimination is not intentional, but present nevertheless? 
 
[43] In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
the standard for identifying invidious discrimination prohibited by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the same as 
the standard applied under Title VII.121  In Davis, black applicants seeking 
jobs as police officers in the District of Columbia claimed that written tests 
required by the department were discriminatory.122  Under Title VII, the 
mere presence of disparate impact is sometimes enough to show that 
discrimination is present.123  In Davis, however, the Court held that the 
“purpose to discriminate” was a critical element in determining whether 
discrimination constituted an equal protection violation.124  Interestingly, 
the Davis decision carved out a special exception for jury selection 
cases.125  The Court held that racial discrimination in jury selection 
excluded blacks was such an “unequal application of the law as to show 
intentional discrimination.”126  The Court held that in cases of 
discrimination related to jury selection traditional disparate impact 
analysis (similar to Title VII cases), in which the burden shifts to the 
challenging party to rebut the presumption of discrimination, is 
appropriate.127 
 
[44] This decision seems to be in tension with the Court’s subsequent 
decision in Purkett.  Purkett placed the burden on the party alleging the 
discriminatory use of a challenge to demonstrate that the reasoning for a 
                                                     
121 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
122See Davis, 426 U.S. at 229. 
123See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establishing that while the mere 
presence of discrimination was enough, it allowed for parties to plead business necessity 
as a defense for their facially neutral, but discriminatory practices). 
124See Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-48 (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)). 
125See id. at 241. 
126Id. (quoting Akins, 325 U.S. at 404). 
127See id. at 242. 
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peremptory strike was not race-neutral.128  The test proposed in this article, 
the Z-Test, offers a mechanism for both parties to determine whether a 
question that is plausibly neutral is, in fact, discriminatory. 
 
[45] To apply the Z-Test, the court or one of the parties must have posed 
the potentially discriminatory question to a suitable sample (at least 400 
respondents) of either citizens qualified for jury service (via public opinion 
poll), or the prospective jurors themselves (via jury questionnaire).  The 
results must be compiled and cross-tabulated by race and gender.  These 
results should then be analyzed according to the following test: 
 
[46] All questions offered for voir dire or jury questionnaires are subject to 
a burden-shifting analysis for discriminatory effect. The opponent to a 
question has the initial burden.  The opponent must demonstrate that the 
challenged question isolates the members of a classification to the degree 
that it is a 98% statistical certainty that such isolation is not due to random 
error.  If successful, the question will be considered potentially 
discriminatory.  The burden then shifts to the party offering the question to 
demonstrate that its significance and importance to the matter at hand 
substantially exceeds any discriminatory impact. Once both parties have 
offered their evidence and reasoning, the court makes a determination as to 
whether strikes based on the answer to the proffered question should be 
permitted.  The court might also find the evidence so compelling as to 
justify the excusing of jurors for cause based on the answer to a specific 
question.  Admittedly, the 98% threshold outlined in the Z-Test is 
somewhat arbitrary.  As a general rule, the classifications of those offering 
a specific response to a given question are distributed along a bell curve 
wherein the majority of all respondents are clustered closest to the mean.  
By adopting a 98% significance threshold for the Z-Test, classifications 
that are clustered in the upper 1% or lower 1% of the bell curve are 
presumed to indicate deviance from the mean with a 98% certainty.129 
 
 
                                                     
128 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 ,767 (1995). 
129The exact mathematical formulas for calculating the Z-Test for percentages can be 
found in most statistics textbooks and treatises. Philip B. Stark, SticiGui: Statistics Tools 
for Internet and Classroom Instruction with a Graphical User Interface, 
http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/users/stark/SticiGui/Text/index.htm (discussing the test and 
its application) (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).  
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D. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE Z-TEST TO DETECT 
DISCRIMINATORY QUESTIONS 
 
[47] To illustrate, Magellan Research conducted a survey of 408 potential 
jurors in Clark County, Nevada.130  Respondents were asked a series of 
demographic questions to identify each according to gender, ethnic origin, 
education, and other factors.  Next, each respondent was presented with a 
set of indicator statements.  For each statement the respondent indicated 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement.  Last, each 
respondent was asked a series of background questions in which he 
provided information regarding previous jury service, termination from 
employment, etc. 
 
[48] Once this information was collected, it was cross-tabulated to display 
the responses to each indicator and background question by demographic 
trait.  The Z-Test for percentages was then used to compare the overall 
results with each demographic trait to determine which demographic traits 
substantially deviated from the mean.  The Z-Test identified demographic 
traits whose deviation from the mean exceeded the 98% significance 
threshold (i.e. the deviation was 98% or more certain to be a valid 
difference, not a random error).  Thus, the Z-Test identified any question 
that could potentially result in a prospective juror with that demographic 
trait being discriminated against if the answer to the question was used as 
the basis for a peremptory challenge.   
 
[49] For the purposes of analyzing the polling results, the demographic 
traits analyzed in this survey can be classified in three groups.  The first 
group (Protected Classes) includes demographic traits that have been 
found by the Supreme Court to be improper for use in exercising 
peremptory challenges—namely, gender and race.  The second group 
(Suspect Classes) is comprised of demographic traits which, although not 
yet considered by the Supreme Court, would likely be considered by most 
courts as improper for use as a basis for peremptory strike based on public 
policy.  These traits are income, marital status, age, education, and 
religious preference.  The third group (Other Classes) is comprised of 
traits that would provide insight into jury selection, but arguably fall short 
                                                     
130 To view the detailed statistical tables used for the conclusions drawn in this paper, see 
Appendix A at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i2/article6/AppendixA.pdf.  
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of qualifying as traits which should not be used based on public policy 
concerns.  These traits are number of children living at home, length of 
residence in the county, job type, and industry. 
 
1. PROTECTED CLASSES 
 
[50] The following table illustrates the questions and responses which the 
Z-Test has identified as discriminatory based on gender. 
 
Table 1.1 - Gender 
Question Response Discriminates 
Against 
Agree Male People should be allowed to own handguns for 
personal protection. Disagree Female 
Agree Male Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated 
the same as other criminals. Disagree Female 
Yes Male Have you ever owned a handgun? 
No Female 
Yes Male Have you or someone in your household ever been 
arrested? No Female 
Yes Male Have you ever witnessed a criminal act of violence? 
No Female 
Yes Male Have you ever been fired or laid off from a job? 
No Female 
 
[51] To illustrate how the preceding table is interpreted, note that 
exercising a peremptory strike on prospective jurors who own a handgun, 
unfairly discriminates against men, while striking those in the venire who 
never owned a handgun unfairly excludes women.  These results are 
hardly surprising and tend to reinforce many existing perceptions 
regarding the differences between men and women. 
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[52] Similarly, the next table displays those questions that result in racial 
or ethnic discrimination. 
Table 1.2 - Ethnic 









Agree Caucasian O.J. Simpson was guilty even though he was acquitted 
in his criminal trial. Disagree Afr Amer 
Agree Hispanic Defense attorneys will say or do just about anything 
to get an acquittal. Disagree Other 
Agree Afr Amer Bill Clinton should be judged by his Presidency, not 




Marijuana is no worse than alcohol and cigarettes and 
should be legalized. 
Disagree Hispanic 
Agree Hispanic Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated 
the same as other criminals. Disagree Caucasian 
Afr Amer 
Other 
Agree Afr Amer It is impossible to get a fair trial in this county. 
Disagree Caucasian 
Agree Hispanic Parents should be held criminally liable for illegal acts 








Do you or someone in your household own a gun of 
any kind? 
No Other 
Has someone in your household ever worked for an 
attorney, judge or court? 
No Hispanic 
Other 
Have you ever served on a criminal jury? No Asian/Pac Isl 
Have you ever served on a civil jury? No Asian/Pac Isl 
Have you ever served on a grand jury? No Hispanic 
Asian/Pac Isl 
Other 
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[53] An interesting observation regarding ethnic bias and jury selection in 
Clark County is that the data shows that often it is Hispanics, not African 
Americans, who are likely to be discriminated against in jury selection if 
stricken based on the response to a voir dire question.  While African 
Americans are still susceptible to discriminatory effect–note the O.J. 
Simpson and fair trial questions—Hispanics appear to be far more likely to 
be the victims of discriminatory impact during voir dire. 
 
[54] One other area in which there is a remarkably clear discriminatory 
effect involves prior jury service.  Asian American/Pacific Islanders are 
unfairly excluded if challenges are used to exclude those that have never 
served on a jury before.  The data also demonstrates that exclusion based 
on lack of previous grand jury service excludes all but Caucasians and 
African Americans. 
 
2. SUSPECT CLASSES 
 
Table 2.1 – Household Income 
Question Response Discriminates 
Against 
A person charged with murder should have to testify at 
trial. 
Disagree 35 to 60K 
60 to 100K 
Over 100K 
Agree Under 20K Bill Clinton should be judged by his Presidency, not his 
sex life. Disagree 20 to 35K 
Agree Under 20K 
20 to 35K 
35 to 60K 
Large corporations never pay their fair share in lawsuits. 
Disagree Over 100K 
Yes Over 100K Do you or someone in your household own a gun of any 
kind? No Under 20K 
Yes Under 20K Have you or someone in your household ever been 
arrested? No Over 100K 
Yes 35 to 60K Has someone in your household ever worked for an 
attorney, judge or court? No Under 20K 
20 to 35K 
Have you ever served on a grand jury? No 60 to 100K 
Yes Under 20K 
20 to 35K 
Have you ever been fired or laid off from a job? 
No 60 to 100K 
Over 100K 
Yes 35 to 60K Have you or someone in your household ever worked in 
law enforcement? No Under 20K 
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Table 2.2 – Marital Status 
Question Response Discriminates 
Against 
Agree Live w/Other Marijuana is no worse than alcohol and cigarettes and 
should be legalized. Disagree Married 
Yes Married Do you or someone in your household own a gun of 
any kind? No Single 
Live w/Other 
Have you ever served on a grand jury? No Live w/Other 
 
Table 2.3 – Age 
Question Response Discriminates 
Against 
Agree 18 to 25 
26 to 35 
A person charged with murder should have to testify 
at trial. 
Disagree 46 to 55 
Over 55 
Agree 26 to 35 Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated 
the same as other criminals. Disagree 46 to 55 
Agree 46 to 55 It is impossible to get a fair trial in this county. 
Disagree 18 to 25 
Yes 18 to 25 Have you or someone in your household ever been 
arrested? No Over 55 
Yes 18 to 25 
36 to 45 
Have you ever witnessed a criminal act of violence? 
No 46 to 55 
Over 55 
Yes Over 55 Have you ever served on a criminal jury? 
No Under 56 
Yes Over 55 Have you ever served on a civil jury? 
No Under 56 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 2 
 
28 
Table 2.4 – Education 
Question Response Discriminates 
Against 
Agree Non HS Grad 
HS Grad 
A person charged with murder should have to testify 
at trial. 
Disagree Coll 
O.J. Simpson was guilty even though he was acquitted 
in his criminal trial. 
Disagree Jr Coll 
Agree Non HS Grad 
Jr Coll 
Large corporations never pay their fair share in 
lawsuits. 
Disagree Coll 
Agree HS Grad Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated 
the same as other criminals. Disagree Post Grad 
Yes Coll 
Post Grad 
Has someone in your household ever worked for an 
attorney, judge or court? 
No HS Grad 
Have you ever served on a grand jury? No Non HS Grad 
Post Grad 
Yes HS Grad 
Jr Coll 
Have you ever been fired or laid off from a job? 
No Post Grad 
Yes Jr Coll Have you or someone in your household ever worked 
in law enforcement? No Non HS Grad 
HS Grad 
 
Table 2.5 – Religion 









O.J. Simpson was guilty even though he was acquitted 
in his criminal trial. 
Disagree Other 
Agree Jewish Bill Clinton should be judged by his Presidency, not 
his sex life. Disagree Protestant 
Catholic 
Other 
Agree None Prosecutors will try to convict a defendant even if 
they’re unsure if he’s guilty. Disagree Protestant 
Other 
Yes Other Do you or someone in your household own a gun of 
any kind? No Jewish 
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Yes Jewish Have you or someone in your household ever sued 
anyone else? No None 
Yes Jewish Have you ever served on a civil jury? 
No None 
 
[55] There are several noteworthy aspects to the data regarding “Suspect 
Classes.”  First, there are several questions which could be used to exclude 
upper-income jurors, senior citizens, and Jewish citizens.  Second, there 
seems to be a fairly clear distinction between respondents with advanced 
educations and those who do not possess college degrees.  Last, it is 
interesting to note that few questions have a discriminatory impact with 
respect to marital status. 
 
3. OTHER CLASSES 
 
[56] The third group, referred to in this article as “Other Classes,” does not 
indicate any substantial danger of discriminatory impact based on number 
of children, length of residence, job, or industry.  While the Z-Test 
identifies some segments which would be potentially singled out—
particularly in the employment categories—the data implying 
discriminatory effects may be somewhat attributable to the limited 
sampling of the poll and the high number of categories (eight each) that 
are used for classification.  
 
[57] It is important to note that Clark County, Nevada, is rather unique in 
several respects.  First, with one notable exception, Clark County permits 
most forms of gambling.131  Second, it has grown at a tremendous rate 
over the last twenty years.132  Thus, its citizens are predominantly people 
who have relocated from other areas.  These differences are noted to 
illustrate that the findings presented in this article are applicable only to 
Clark County.  Additional polling should be performed independently in 
other jurisdictions to conduct similar analysis. 
 
                                                     
131 See About Clark County, 
http://www.co.clark.nv.us/public_communications/About_clark_county.htm (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2006). 
132 Id. (“Clark County is one of the fastest-growing areas in the country, with more than 
5,000 people moving here each month”).  
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[58] A potential obstacle for the Z-Test, or any Batson analysis for that 
matter, occurs when a question both violates the 98% threshold and is 
substantively applicable to the case at hand.  Take the “Have you ever 
been a victim of a violent crime?” question, for example.  In most cases, 
this question would be excluded because it could, perhaps unfairly, be 
used to exclude significant numbers of women from the jury.  Yet this 
information would be vital to both defense and prosecution alike in a 
sexual assault trial. 
 
[59] To overcome this important dilemma, courts employing the Z-Test 
should apply a burden-shifting framework similar to that advocated by 
Batson.133 First, the party who wishes to exclude a question from voir dire 
bears the burden of using the Z-Test to demonstrate its discriminatory 
effect.  Opposing counsel would then be afforded an opportunity to present 
arguments on why the probative value of the responses to the proffered 
question substantially outweighs any discriminatory impact.  The trial 
court would then rule on the use of the question in a manner similar to 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence.134  Unless the probative value 
substantially outweighs the discriminatory impact, the question should be 
excluded from voir dire and peremptory challenges based on response to 
the question (if asked in a preliminary jury questionnaire) should not be 
permitted. 
 
[60] There are some obvious shortcomings to the Z-Test.  Foremost among 
these is the requirement that a jury questionnaire be used, or a public 
opinion poll be conducted, in order for the test to be applied.  While the 
litigants might assume the additional expense of conducting polls or 
distributing questionnaires, the issue of unequal justice (i.e. wealthy 
parties could more easily afford the costs associated with employing the Z-
Test) would be a legitimate concern.  Additionally, the court would be 
well advised to closely monitor the polling and questionnaire techniques 
employed to insure fairness and accuracy.  Finally, the Z-Test is based on 
sampling and mathematical reasoning – components that are seldom found 
in today’s courtrooms and even less frequently understood by today’s 
judges and attorneys.  Shortcomings aside, the Z-Test offers a meaningful 
                                                     
133 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 97-98. 
134See FED. R. EVID. 403.  “[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” 
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and non-discriminatory method for the court to honor the spirit of Batson 




[61] The ultimate goal of the judicial system is a fair and equal trial system 
for both litigants and jurors.  The Supreme Court has made great strides 
toward this end with its decisions in Batson and its progeny.  The Court is 
continually challenged to balance the needs of several groups.  Defendants 
are ultimately concerned with receiving a trial by a jury of their peers that 
accurately and fairly represents a cross-section of the community.  
Attorneys are concerned with protecting their time-honored right of 
peremptory challenge as one of the tools they can employ to zealously 
represent their client.  Judges are justifiably anxious that further 
complicating the process of jury selection will result in an even more 
tedious and time-consuming trial calendar.  And finally, prospective jurors 
(the most overlooked of these parties) are collectively concerned that their 
constitutional right to serve on juries might be restricted by a morass of 
facially neutral, but discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by 
overly zealous attorneys.  The Z-Test outlined in this article is not a 
panacea for the problem of discriminatory challenges; indeed, it is likely 
that the problem could only truly be solved by the complete abolition of 
peremptory strikes. 
 
[62] Since the elimination of peremptory strikes is unlikely to occur, the 
Z-Test provides the court with a mechanism for detecting use of voir dire 
responses in ways that may facially comply with Batson, especially as 
Batson was applied by the Court in Purkett, but are nevertheless 
discriminatory. 
